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 I. FOREWORD 
Imagine the following situation; an individual is 
upset, he has listened to the City Council debate whether it 
is in the cities interest to take his home, raze it (and his 
 2 
entire neighborhood in the process), pay him, and give the 
land to a major automobile manufacturer at a fraction of its 
worth so that the manufacturer can make more cars cheaply, 
in Michigan.  In this public debate tempers have flared and 
the discussion has become heated. 
 The individual, like many others attending this council 
meeting discussing eminent domain, is an upstanding member 
of society.  He has no criminal record, he has always played 
by society’s rules, and now “they ” are taking his house.  
They are going to destroy his home, his neighborhood, and 
his community.   
 His emotions are running high; he’s feeling angry and 
resentful.  So angry he might be driven to do something he 
would have never contemplated before.  He reaches into his 
pocket and fumbles around for something.  A police officer 
standing nearby notices the glint of something shiny and 
metallic, and approaches.  No sooner has the man put the 
cigarette to his lips and fumbled for his Zippo lighter than 
the officer tells him that if he lights it, he goes to jail. 
 Now imagine the same scenario but instead of a shiny 
Zippo lighter in the man’s pocket, the officer notices the 
cold steel glint of a semi-automatic handgun strapped to the 
mans chest.  This time, as tempers continue to flare, the 
officer can do nothing.  He can only hope that this man 
doesn’t cross the line, and let his emotions take him on a 
dangerous path.  The officer must also contend with the fact 
that there could be many more like him.  This crowd could be 
 3 
filled with literally dozens of semi-automatic weapons, but 
this time, unlike the Zippo scenario, the officer can do 
nothing.   
That’s right, until the man actually brandishes the 
pistol, a point of no return in the above scenario, the 
officer can’t stop the man from carrying the weapon.  
Neither can the city council prevent the crowd from bringing 
in their handguns.  For those that remember the contentious 
debate over the Poletown neighborhood in Detroit1, it is not 
                                                 
1
 The Poletown neighborhood battle is one of the most 
documented cases of a neighborhood fighting against the 
forces of commerce, and losing.  In 1981 the City of 
Detroit, and the City of Hamtramck allied with General 
Motors for the purpose of building a new factory.  The 
location chosen was a traditionally ethnic immigrant 
community, in the heart of Detroit along the Hamtramck 
border, known as Poletown.  The factory was to be a state of 
the art facility designed to revitalize Detroit.  The main 
problem with the location was that 4,200 people lived there, 
and there were 1,300 homes that had to be destroyed, as well 
as 140 businesses, 6 churches, and a hospital.  The homes 
were purchased for between six and thirteen thousand dollars 
with an additional fifteen thousand dollars made available 
to purchase a new home and three thousand five hundred 
dollars being offered if the residents moved by a certain 
date.  Unfortunately, the money was insufficient for nearly 
forty percent of the people to buy a new home and many 
people did not want to move.  The battle against a municipal 
taking was waged in court first and later in the form of 
sit-in demonstrations.  See, Poletown Neighborhood Council 
v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich., 1981).  The crux 
of the neighborhood argument against the taking of people’s 
property was that the taking was for a private, not a public 
purpose.  Unfortunately for the neighborhood association, 
the Michigan Supreme Court held that the economic benefits 
of a new factory constituted a public purpose sufficient to 
validate the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 
Poletown Neighborhood Council, 304 N.W.2d at 459.   Ralph 
Nader was one of the principal spokesmen for the 
neighborhood association.  The collapse of the 
neighborhoods’ survival campaign culminated with the Detroit 
Police forcibly removing dozens of worshippers from the 
Immaculate Conception Catholic Church, during regular Sunday 
 4 
too hard to imagine the story described above, and 
unfortunately, as of July of 2001, a city in Michigan, under 
almost every circumstance, is prohibited from stopping a 
concealed weapons permit holder from going just about 
anywhere with that handgun. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION 
Michigan law provides that a concealed weapon permit 
must be issued, upon request, to any applicant that meets 
the statutory guidelines.2  This law was enacted during the 
2000 legislative session, and became effective in July of 
2001.  The law is known as a “shall issue ” law, because so 
long as the statutory guidelines are met, the applicant must 
be given a permit, even if there are other public policy 
concerns that might counsel against giving out such a 
permit; or at the very least, concerns justifing more 
precise regulation of where a permit-holder may take his 
weapon.  These policy concerns may be as mundane as the 
local desire of a particular municipality to minimize the 
number of concealed handguns in a crowded public hearing 
room.  And the increased regulation on where one may and may 
not carry may range from the unique circumstances of a 
particularly contentious issue being debated to the no 
                                                                                                                                                 
mass, and arresting several of them.  The factory was 
ultimately built but the neighborhood was destroyed.  See 
also, Nolan, Jenny, Autoplant v. neighborhood: The Poletown 
battle, Detroit News online, 
http://detnews.com/history/poletown/poletown.htm 
2
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.421 et seq. (2001). 
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longer remote possibility of a terrorist threat on a 
building or a particular occupant. 
Prior to the shall issue law being enacted, Michigan 
adopted a law prohibiting municipalities from adopting any 
ordinance pertaining to or regulating nearly every aspect of 
firearm ownership.3  This first law is effectively a no-
interference law because it prohibits municipalities from 
imposing restrictions on firearms4. These two laws, when 
read together, create a broad prohibition on municipalities 
that prevents them from protecting municipal property and 
employees from the potentially devastating effects of 
someone wielding a firearm. 
Michigan law also requires that municipalities protect 
the public health.5  At the same time, by enacting the 
shall-issue statute described above, the legislature has 
taken away the power of municipal officials to act in their 
own best interests.  The state legislature has, by statute, 
seemingly taken away their power to regulate this area of 
the public health.   This paper asserts that it is unclear 
whether an actual conflict exists between the duties and 
responsibilities of municipal officials, should they find a 
restriction on weapons necessary, and the law as enacted by 
the legislature, but that such a conflict is likely.   
There are two significant issues addressed in this 
paper; first, whether municipal ordinances that restrict the 
                                                 
3
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.  § 123.1101 et seq (2001). 
4 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.  § 123.1101 et seq. 
 6 
possession of weapons in public places are pre-empted by the 
state shall-issue law, and second, if so, whether the 
state’s pre-emption of municipal authority to create such 
ordinances violates the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution because it bears no rational relationship to a 
legitimate state purpose.  This paper asserts that there may 
be an actual conflict, but that this is far from certain, 
and in any event municipalities still have the power to 
regulate weapons on municipal premises. 
Even if a conflict exists, it is the duty of the 
legislature to pass laws that survive an equal protection 
challenge.  In this instance, it appears that there is no 
rational basis for the state to completely prohibit any law 
affecting weapons, when such a law may have completely local 
reason for being.  If this is the case, and if a 
municipality can successfully assert standing, then how can 
it be that the legislature should find it necessary to 
prohibit firearms in the senate gallery, on school property 
not occupied by students, or in a courthouse, yet a 
municipality like Detroit, should have no similar power?  
It is the position of this paper that either the 
municipality proper, or its officials in their individual 
capacity have standing to bring an equal protection claim, 
and that under such a claim, prohibiting municipal officials 
from restricting firearms on municipal property serves no 
legitimate state purpose, and is not rationally related to 
                                                                                                                                                 
5 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann.  § 117.4 et seq (2001). 
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any legitimate state interest, hypothetical or otherwise.  
Finally, as applied to the municipal property of home rule 
cities, the equal protection clause does not tolerate the 
distinctions made in the state law. 
Despite what the laws purport to say, it is well 
recognized that Home Rule Cities, may still pass ordinances 
affecting firearms on municipal property and in the 
municipality in general.  While a literal reading of the law 
would seem to evidence an intent by the legislature to 
foreclose any municipal authority regarding restricting 
weapons, this is not really true.  In fact, there are 
numerous instances where a city is permitted to restrict 
firearms6.  This paper will demonstrate that in addition to 
the right of municipalities to restrict the use of firearms, 
as in ordinances prohibiting discharge within city limits, 
cities may also restrict the possession of such arms, when 
such possession runs contrary to municipal duties as a home 
rule city. 
This paper provides a model ordinance that may 
withstand constitutional scrutiny and might be effectively 
used to prohibit firearms from municipal premises.  This 
ordinance asserts the powers of a Home Rule City, asserts 
the necessity of the ordinance and provides the legal 
framework for its existence. 
                                                 
6
 For example, Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.1104 allows 
cities to regulate the discharge of firearms within city 
limits. 
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This paper concludes with the assertion that weapons 
have no place on municipal premises, that given the 
realities of the world today, such presence is a real and 
present danger to the effective institution of governmental 
business, and that such a prohibition burdens no cognizable 
constitutional or statutory right. 
 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE BILL AND ITS HISTORY 
 The Michigan legislature passed the so-called shall 
issue law in 2000.7  In the bill summaries prepared for both 
the House and Senate there is no record of any consideration 
being given to whether local units of government have 
control over rules regulating possession on municipal 
property. 
 The bill was passed by a lame-duck legislature and 
specific attention was paid to making a law not susceptible 
to referendum.8 The bill was challenged by petition but was 
never subjected to the peoples right of referendum because 
the Michigan Supreme Court in its M.U.C.C.9 decision 
rejected the claim that the appropriations measure included 
in the bill was placed there solely to defeat the right of 
                                                 
7
 Public Act No. 381 of 2000, (House Bill 4530), enacted as 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 28.425 et seq. (2001). 
8
 Michigan United Conservation Clubs v. Secretary of State, 
630 N.W.2d 297, 318 (Mich. 2000, Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) 
(discussing that an appropriations bill is immune from 
referendum under the Michigan Constitution) . 
9 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d 297. 
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referendum.  The dissent in M.U.C.C.10 spent considerable 
time explaining the behavior of the legislature in rushing 
to pass the bill, and seeking to avoid a public vote by 
attaching an appropriation measure to the bill.11  In support 
of this proposition several state senators claimed that the 
appropriations measures contained in the bill were put there 
for no other reason than to avoid a vote by the electorate.12  
In M.U.C.C. petitioners were unsuccessful in their bid to 
bring the shall-issue law to a vote in a statewide 
referendum.  It is with this history in mind that the law 
must be analyzed.   
 
IV. FORUM SELECTION 
In determining the appropriate forum for litigating the 
constitutionality of the states’ shall issue law, and its no 
interference law regarding municipal ordinances dealing with 
firearms, it is important to determine the forum where such 
litigation may arise.  It is unlikely that the state of 
Michigan would bring a claim directly against the 
municipality13.  It is much more likely that the law will be 
                                                 
10
 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 318 
(Mich. 2000, Cavanaugh, J. dissenting). 
11 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 318 
(Mich. 2000, Cavanaugh, J., dissenting). 
12 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 319 FN 3 
(Mich. 2000, Cavanaugh, J., dissenting) (Senators Byrum and 
Gast indicated that the appropriation was made “ to make 
[the bill] bulletproof and ballot-proof). 
13
 More typically Attorney’s General in Michigan seem to 
prefer to allow private citizens to directly challenge 
ordinances they believe to be overly restrictive and then 
join such an action when the ordinance at issue concerns an 
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challenged by an individual or group upset with a perceived 
infringement on their right to keep and bear arms.  If a 
claim is brought under these circumstances, it will 
necessarily be adjudicated in state court.  It is the 
position of this paper that litigating this issue in state 
court markedly reduces the likelihood of success for the 
municipality.   
The Michigan Supreme Court has demonstrated a 
substantial degree of hostility toward municipal authority 
in the area of gun control legislation, as evidenced by the 
M.U.C.C.14 decision.  Due to the tone and tenor of the 
M.U.C.C. ruling, any challenge made on Equal Protection 
grounds ought to be made in federal court.  First, the 
federal court has jurisdiction because the alleged violation 
arises under the equal protection clause and is therefore a 
federal question.15  Furthermore, in federal question 
jurisdiction, it is federal, not state substantive law that 
applies.16  While a federal court may be sympathetic to a 
state court position there is no mandate that the federal 
court bind itself to what it perceives the state court would 
rule.  This being the case, the municipality would at least 
be in a forum without a history of ruling the other sides’ 
way. 
                                                                                                                                                 
issue affecting important state-wide interests.  See, Balogh 
v. City of Flatrock, 394 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. Ct. App., 1985). 
14
 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d 297. 
15
 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
16
 Erie Railroad, 304 U.S. 64. 
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The key issue in getting this case into a federal court 
is a matter of litigation strategy.  While a municipality 
could wait for a plaintiff to bring suit; that would result 
in the case going to state court regardless of the Equal 
Protection defense being offered in this paper17.  Instead, a 
municipality ought to use the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act to bring suit directly in federal court18.  The question 
of standing is obviously more delicate, and will be 
addressed in greater detail later in this paper, but it 
appears that even if the municipality itself would have 
difficulty bringing an action on its own behalf, there is no 
similar difficulty in the case of municipal workers bringing 
the challenge as the potentially injured parties. 
It is possible that the federal court may elect to 
decline jurisdiction under a Pullman19 abstention, because 
the court might determine that the issue of whether there is 
preemption in the first place is a state issue that 
substantially predominates the claim, and that the state 
                                                 
17
 See, 28 U.S.C. 1441(b).  The so-called “well pleaded 
complaint rule ”  provides that the federal claim must be an 
element of the plaintiff’s cause of action, and is designed 
to prevent litigants from using a defensive argument to gain 
access to a federal court, and in the present matter would 
prevent the case from being removed to federal court by the 
municipal defendants.  For a discussion of this rule see, 
Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 
(1981). 
18
 28 U.S.C. § 2201.  While the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act does not confer jurisdiction it does create an avenue to 
pursue a cause of action once independent grounds have been 
found; in this case, the Equal Protection clause.  See, 
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 
(1950). 
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issue created by the law is sufficiently unclear so as to 
justify abstaining and allowing the state to work out the 
problem.  Such a determination by the federal court would 
not be fatal to the success of the argument because 
plaintiffs may make use of an England20 reservation to 
preserve the underlying claim in federal court.  If it 
appears that the federal court is leaning toward abstaining 
it is important that the municipality appeal to the court to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction21 which allows a federal 
court to hear a state claim whenever there is a claim 
“ arising under [federal law], and the relationship between 
that claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that 
the entire action before the court comprises but one 
constitutional ‘case’. ” 22 
 
V. STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND PREEMPTION 
Regardless of the forum selected by a municipality (or 
foisted upon it by a zealous plaintiff), the first issue 
that must be addressed once litigation begins, is 
                                                                                                                                                 
19
 Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 
(1941). 
20
 England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 
U.S. 411 (1964) (establishing that a litigant may reserve 
his right to make a federal claim by first allowing the 
claim to be litigated in state court, and if the issue 
involving the federal claim is, in fact, not resolved at the 
state court level, the claim is preserved in federal court; 
but disallowing the use of abstention solely as a means of 
avoiding the case on the part of the bench).  
21
 28 U.S.C. § 1367. 
22
 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). 
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demonstrating that the municipality had the authority to 
pass the ordinance in the first place. 
The Second Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “ [a] well-regulated militia being necessary 
to the security of a free state, the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms shall not be infringed. ” 23  In Michigan, 
the state Constitution provides even broader rights to carry 
firearms than the U.S. Constitution by providing that 
“ [e]very person has a right to keep and bear arms for the 
defense of himself and the state. ” 24 The Michigan concealed 
weapons law is specific that; 
[t]he commissioner or chief of police of a city, 
township, or village police department that issues 
licenses to purchase, carry, or transport pistols, 
or his or her duly authorized deputy, or the 
sheriff or his duly authorized deputy, in the 
parts of a county not included within a city, 
township or village having an organized police 
department, in discharging the duty to issue 
licenses shall with due speed and diligence issue 
licenses to purchase, carry, or transport pistols 
to qualified applicants residing within the city, 
village, township, or county, as applicable…25 
 
This law was enacted against the backdrop of a pre-existing 
law prohibiting a municipality from enacting or enforcing 
“ any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate in 
any other manner the ownership, registration, purchase, 
sale, transfer, transportation or possession of pistols or 
other firearms.” 26  This underlying law raises the initial 
obstacle to the validity of a municipal ordinance, field 
                                                 
23
 U.S. Const amend II. 
24
 Mich. Const. (1963), Art. I, Sec. 6. 
25 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.422(3) (2001) (emphasis added). 
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preemption.  Clearly the legislature had an eye on 
preemption, the sole question remaining is, were they 
successful? 
Clearly, the language of Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 
123.1102 is difficult to overcome with a purely statutory 
attack.  However, it is arguable that none of the 
prohibitions imposed by  § 123.1102 apply to a law 
restricting where one may voluntarily take ones firearm.  
Obviously, prohibiting firearms on municipal property does 
not pertain to or regulate the ownership, registration, 
purchase, sale, or transfer of pistols or other firearms.  
This leaves open the question of whether a prohibition in or 
on municipal property pertains to or regulates 
transportation or possession of such weapons.  Of these two, 
transportation is probably the easier to dispense with.  
Transportation, in the context of this statute should 
arguably be read in a manner consistent with federal laws 
relating to firearms27.  In a context like that of § 
123.1102, the language is designed to refer to commerce 
related restrictions and means the moving of such firearms 
from one location to another.  If interpreted in this way, 
the ordinance proposed in this paper would not be 
implicated; there is no attempt to restrict weapons by 
impeding the free flow of trade, nor even to hinder the 
                                                                                                                                                 
26
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.1102 (2001). 
27
 Compare with, 18 U.S.C.A. 922 et seq. 
 15 
movements of individuals owning firearms from one location 
to another.  
While arguing that an ordinance prohibiting possession 
of a weapon on municipal property does not regulate or 
pertain to the possession of a firearm would appear to be 
more difficult than threading a needle without any thumbs, 
this is not really the case.  Possession in this case is not 
a defined term so it is appropriate to look to the ordinary 
meaning of the word in evaluating its meaning in the present 
circumstance28.  When determining the ordinary meaning of a 
word it is acceptable to use a dictionary29.  According to a 
standard desk dictionary, possession means “the act or fact 
of possessing ” and possess means “[t]o have as property; 
[to] own. ” 30  It is manifestly apparent that the proposed 
ordinance in this paper does not impinge on anyone’s right 
of ownership.  The simpler, more direct and therefore more 
reasonable interpretation of the intent of the state law is 
that municipalities are not empowered to restrict a persons 
right to have and own a firearm31.  The proposed ordinance 
would not do this, and would therefore, arguably, not 
conflict with the state law.  This ordinance would limit 
                                                 
28
 People v. Aguwa, 626 N.W.2d 176, 179 (Mich. Ct. App., 
2001). 
29
 People v. Morey, 603 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Mich., 1999). 
30
 Landau, Sidney I., Editor in Chief, Funk and Wagnalls 
Standard Desk Dictionary, Volume 2, 514-515, (Rand McNally 
and Co., 1979). 
31 Morey, 603 N.W.2d at 253 (explaining that when a 
dictionary definition is used the plain, ordinary definition 
of a word is to be used when that meaning is relevant to 
interpreting the statute). 
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where one can and cannot go with the firearm he possesses, 
this is a subtle, yet potentially effective distinction that 
ought to be pursued concurrently with the claims being 
addressed in this paper. 
The Michigan Court of Appeals recently articulated the 
standard for determining whether a state statute has 
preempted a local ordinance by holding that a municipal 
ordinance is preempted by state law if the statute 
completely occupies the field that the ordinance occupies, 
or if the ordinance conflicts with a state statute 
directly.32 
The procedure for determining preemption was described 
in more exhaustive detail the Michigan Supreme Court’s 
Rental Property Owners33 decision.  In that case, the 
Michigan Supreme Court quoted People v. Llewelyn34 as the 
standard followed in Michigan for over 25 years.  The 
Llewelyn factors are; first, whether the state statute 
completely occupies the field of regulation regarding the 
subject addressed in both the statute and the ordinance; 
second, whether state law expressly provides that the 
state’s authority to regulate in a specified area of law is 
exclusive; third, whether the nature of the regulated 
subject matter demands exclusive state regulation because it 
                                                 
32
 Muskegon Area Rental Association v. City of Muskegon, 244 
Mich. App. 45, 50-52 (2001) (citing Rental Property Owners 
Association of Kent County v. City of Grand Rapids, 455 
Mich. 246 (1997).). 
33
 Rental Property Owners Association of Kent County, 455 
Mich. 246. 
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is necessary to achieve the uniformity intended by the state 
in enacting the statute and; fourth, whether the preemption 
of a field of regulation can be implied from a close 
examination of the legislative history.35 
Applying the standard laid out by the Michigan Supreme 
Court to the factual circumstances at issue regarding the 
shall-issue law it is apparent that it would be difficult 
for a municipality to defeat a preemption argument.  
Although neither the shall-issue law, nor its preexisting 
counter-part36 expressly provide that the authority to 
regulate firearms is exclusively a state endeavor, they do 
evidence this intent and seem to completely occupy the 
field.  Although it is the pre-existing law that is the 
heart of the issue of preemption, it is the controversy 
about the necessity for municipalities to protect employees 
and the public interest, in light of the addition of many 
more people possessing concealed weapons permits, that gives 
rise to the overreaching of the state law.  It is undisputed 
in this paper that without such broad allowances for those 
carrying concealed weapons, there would be no need to worry 
about where firearms can and cannot be prohibited.  It is 
because of the tandem effect of these two laws that they are 
being examined together in this paper.  As stated earlier, 
the restrictions on municipalities are that “ a local unit 
                                                                                                                                                 
34
 People v. Llewelyn 401 Mich. 314 (1972). 
35
 Llewelyn 401 Mich. at 323-324. 
36
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.421 et seq and Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. § 123.1101 (2001).  
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of government shall not impose a special taxation on, enact 
or enforce any ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or 
regulate in any other manner the ownership, registration, 
purchase, sale, transfer, transportation or possession of 
pistols or other firearms. ” 37   
In fact, the legislative history of the shall-issue law 
clearly demonstrates that the legislature considered and 
defeated a proposal that would have exempted government 
buildings from the generalized right to carry a concealed 
weapon.38  Despite this lack of an exemption, it appears that 
the rule of reason has prevailed, and government buildings 
are doing exactly what the defeated amendment would have 
done.39  
                                                 
37
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.1102 (2001). 
38
 Roll Call 283 of May 26, 1999). 
39
 See, Authors notes from telephone calls made February 14, 
2002, and email response from Office of the Secretary of the 
Senate. (According to numerous people in various state 
buildings, including the State Capitol, an individual will 
not be permitted to bring a weapon, concealed or otherwise, 
into any state building.  When this author pressed for any 
statutory authority or rule-based authority for such a 
prohibition no one was able to provide one.  According to 
the Michigan State Police, who control security at the State 
Capitol if one attempted to enter the capitol building with 
a firearm, the guards would prevent entry and worry about 
what law was violated later.  Subsequent telephone calls to 
the Michigan Attorney General’s office produced no better 
results.  Attorneys within the Attorney General’s Office 
were also unable to provide authority to bar admission into 
state buildings, but did confirm that such behavior would be 
prevented by state police, and supported by the Attorney 
General’s Office.) Readers, please note that no individual 
was publicly willing to go on record confirming the 
existence of the policy followed by state police guards.  
However, the existence of this policy may be readily 
confirmed by going to, or calling any state government 
building controlled by, or operated on behalf of, the 
Michigan legislature. 
 19 
An argument might be made that the defeat of the 
government building exemption did not evidence the intent to 
prevent municipalities from protecting their employees and 
citizens.  The legislative history of the law shows that the 
defeat was primarily due to a desire to simplify the terms 
of the law.40  It is unlikely that the intent of the 
legislature was to allow the House and Senate galleries to 
be filled with gun-toting taxpayers the next time a tax hike 
is contemplated; yet with the defeat of this exemption this 
is precisely the behavior that the legislature apparently 
had elected to allow.  If not for the common sense approach 
being applied by the state police, who control entry into 
state buildings, this behavior would be allowed under the 
law.  “ It is a familiar rule that a thing may be within the 
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, 
because not within its spirit nor within the intention of 
its makers. ” 41 It is the position of this paper that the 
                                                 
40
 House Legislative Analysis, Revised First Analysis (6-8-
99), Second Analysis (1-4-01), Third Analysis as Enrolled 
(1-4-01) (discussing generally the reasons for avoiding 
additions to the law as being unnecessary to achieve the 
primary purposes of the law; which were uniformity in 
issuing permits and ease in receiving a permit for those 
authorized by law to do so). 
41
 Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 
(1892) (a church in New York hired a minister in England and 
paid for his voyage to the United States so that he could 
minister to the congregation.  Prior to the hiring of the 
minister, and the church agreeing to pay the ministers 
passage, a law was passed by the United States Congress, 
prohibiting persons from paying the fare for anyone hired 
abroad with the intention of importing that person for the 
purpose of performing labor in the United States.  The 
church was charged with violating this law, and while the 
U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the church had violated the 
 20 
shall-issue and concealed carry laws do not, in fact, mean 
what they say.  “ If a literal construction of the words of 
a statute be absurd, the [law] must be so construed as to 
avoid the absurdity. ” 42 
Additionally, although the state regulatory scheme is 
pervasive, this is a factor only, and is not a determinative 
part of the Rental Property Owners  criteria.43  However, of 
potentially persuasive value, it was noted during the debate 
on passing the shall-issue law that the nature of the 
regulated subject matter, concealed weapons, demands an 
exclusive state-wide system of regulation to serve the 
purported interests of the state in achieving uniformity in 
obtaining a permit and simplifying the application process.44  
In arguing against this language it should be noted that 
mere mentioning of the keywords used in examining a statute 
for the necessity of preemption is unlikely to be persuasive 
enough to convince a court to be bound by it.  As the U.S. 
Supreme Court articulated in Romer v. Evans45, “even in the 
ordinary equal protection case calling for the most 
deferential of standards, we insist on knowing the relation 
                                                                                                                                                 
letter of the law, it held that the spirit of the law was 
not violated because the law couldn’t possibly have meant 
what it said as applied to the facts of this case). 
42 Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 460. 
43
 Rental Property Owners Association of Kent County, 455 
Mich. 246. 
44
 House Legislative Analysis, Revised First Analysis (6-8-
99), Second Analysis (1-4-01), Third Analysis as Enrolled 
(1-4-01). 
45
 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). 
 21 
between the classification adopted and the object to be 
attained. ”   
 
VI. MUNICIPAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT A PROHIBATORY ORDINANCE 
While it would be difficult to enact an ordinance that 
would survive a challenge under the laws addressed in this 
paper46 there are numerous avenues available to different 
home rule cities to avoid application of the law. 
There are potential city- and building-specific 
exemptions that may be utilized on a case by case basis for 
various local units of government to successfully prohibit 
handguns.  For example, courts, as a separate unit of 
government, are granted wide latitude in decisions regarding 
court rules.  The Michigan Supreme Court went so far as to 
permit the complete prohibition of firearms by every court 
in the state.47  While this prohibition is designed to 
protect the courts, many municipalities have their courts in 
the same building as their other municipal offices, and 
could probably prohibit firearms under an umbrella type ban 
by the court located under the same roof.48  
Presumably, following the logic of the Michigan Supreme 
Court in its M.U.C.C.49 ruling, as emphasized by its 
                                                 
46
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.1101 et seq. (2001). 
47
 Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order, 2001-1 (March 
27, 2001). 
48
 An example of the existence of municipal offices and 
courts in the same building may be found in The City of 
Kentwood, a suburb of Grand Rapids, Michigan. 
49 Michigan United Conservation Clubs, 630 N.W.2d at 318. 
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subsequent administrative order,50 the various offices of he 
executive branch, as a distinct branch of government could 
proscribe firearms on their premises.  Similarly, since the 
legislative branch is already doing this, despite declining 
to expressly add this authority into the statute, it would 
seem that municipalities could successfully argue that they 
too, as subdivisions of the legislative branch, can also 
proscribe firearms on municipal premises.   
If, on the other hand, municipalities cannot protect 
themselves as subdivisions of the legislative branch, the 
arguments against the law may be expanded.  Additional 
arguments should also include vagueness, over-inclusiveness, 
and under-inclusiveness.51 These arguments would become more 
persuasive under these circumstances because it would now be 
impossible for anyone to discern what core of conduct is 
constitutionally prohibited.  The law would then be enforced 
in an arbitrary and capricious manner because some 
                                                 
50 Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order, 2001-1 (March 
27, 2001). 
51
 The focus of this paper is not on challenges to the state 
law based upon these grounds, but that the opportunity for 
such a challenge may exist is noted here solely to provide 
insight into a possible alternate avenue for challenging the 
law.  However, such a challenge may implicate a procedural 
due process right of the municipality in the “life ” of its 
officials or in the municipalities right to control 
municipal property.  For an in depth analysis of standing 
for a municipality to challenge the state on procedural due 
process grounds see, Lawrence, Michael A., Do “ Creatures Of 
The State ” Have Constitutional Rights?: Standing For 
Municipalities To Assert Procedural Due Process Claims 
Against The State. Villanova L. Rev. Vol. 47, No. 1, 93 
(2002). 
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subdivisions would be protected and others would not without 
a rational and articulated reason for the distinction.52  
Under Michigan law, “ each city may in its charter 
provide… (3) For the exercise of all municipal powers in the 
management and control of municipal property and in the 
administration of the municipal government, whether such 
powers be expressly enumerated or not[.]” 53  This language 
could reasonably be interpreted to mean that the legislature 
has granted all powers the legislature would have otherwise 
had regarding buildings and property owned by a Home Rule 
city, to that Home Rule city.  In fact, in the remainder of 
the statute, the legislature made clear that other municipal 
powers relating to the interests of the city, good 
government, and inhabitants of the municipality may be 
restricted by the legislature.54   
It is a well-settled principle of jurisprudence that 
laws are to be interpreted so as to not render a part of 
them meaningless.55  Applying this rule to Mich. Comp. Laws 
Ann. 117.4j leads to the conclusion that the legislature 
meant to abdicate authority it would have had in this area 
to municipalities.  Furthermore, the broad prohibition laid 
                                                 
52
 The Fifth Amendment governs vagueness arguments.  See, 
U.S. Const. amend. 5.  The touchstone rationale for 
invalidating a vague law is that it “may trap the innocent 
by not providing fair warning. ”  Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (citing Papachristou v. 
City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972), and other 
citations which have been omitted).  For an in depth 
analysis of these challenges see, Grayned, 408 U.S. 104. 
53
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 117.4j (emphasis added). 
54
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 117.4j. 
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out in Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.110256 is narrowed by 
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.110357 which provides that 
municipalities may regulate conduct that would be a criminal 
offense under other state law.  With this exception it may 
be argued that other conduct on the part of a municipality 
would also be acceptable. 
The mere fact that the state, in the exercise of 
the police power, has made certain regulations 
does not prohibit a municipality from exacting 
additional requirements.... The fact that an 
ordinance enlarges upon the provisions of a 
statute by requiring more than the statute 
requires creates no conflict therewith unless the 
statute limits the requirement for all cases to 
its own prescription. Thus, where both an 
ordinance and a statute are prohibitory, and the 
only difference between them is that the ordinance 
goes further in its prohibition but not counter to 
the prohibition under the statute, and the 
municipality does not attempt to authorize by the 
ordinance what the legislature has forbidden or 
forbid what the legislature has expressly 
licensed, authorized, or required, there is 
nothing contradictory between the provisions of 
                                                                                                                                                 
55
 See, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
56
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.1102 provides that;  
[a] local unit of government shall not impose 
special taxation on, enact or enforce any 
ordinance or regulation pertaining to, or regulate 
in any other manner, the ownership, registration, 
purchase, sale, transfer, transportation, or 
possession of pistols or other firearms, or 
components of pistols or other firearms, except as 
otherwise provided by federal law or a law of this 
state. 
57
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 123.1103 provides that local units 
of government are not prohibited; 
from doing either of the following:  
(a) Prohibiting or regulating conduct with a 
pistol or other firearm that is a criminal 
offense under state law.  
(b) Prohibiting or regulating the transportation, 
carrying, or possession of pistols and other 
firearms by employees of that local unit of 
government in the course of their employment 
with that local unit of government. 
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the statute and the ordinance because of which 
they cannot coexist and be effective.58 
 
Although this line of argument is persuasive in some 
contexts, it is not especially likely to be determinative 
under the facts outlined in this paper, so alternative 
arguments ought also be pursued.  Because this argument is 
probably not sufficiently persuasive, the single greatest 
challenge is crafting an argument that will likely survive 
summary disposition.  It is precisely this necessity that 
gives rise to the argument in this paper that the Equal 
Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution is 
unconstitutionally impinged.  
 
VII. CRITIQUING THE LAW UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE 
 After enacting an ordinance restricting concealed 
weapons in particular, and other weapons generally, from 
public buildings, litigation will likely follow; whether it 
is initiated by the municipality seeking a declaratory 
judgment, or by a citizen alleging his rights have been 
infringed by enforcement of the ordinance.59  In either case, 
the municipality and the affected municipal employees must 
answer the most likely challenge, that state law has 
                                                 
58
 City of Detroit v. Qualls 454 N.W.2d 374, 385 FN 41 
(Mich., 1990) (quoting 56 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal Corporations, 
§ 374, pp. 408-409). 
59
 It is possible that an individual could make a pre-
enforcement, facial, challenge arguing that there is no set 
of circumstances under which the ordinance would be valid.  
For a discussion of the requirements for making a facial 
challenge see, City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 55 
(1999). 
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preempted the ordinance.  The municipality and its employees 
should assert that the law violates the Equal Protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution60 because it bears no rational relationship to a 
legitimate state interest.  The Fourteenth Amendment 
provides in pertinent part that: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
are citizens of the United States and the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges 
or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws61. 
 
Although classical interpretation of municipal standing 
seems to prohibit a municipality from asserting an equal 
protection claim62, there is no similar prohibition on the 
ability of individual municipal authorities to assert an 
equal protection claim in their individual capacity.63  There 
                                                 
60
 U.S. Const. Amend XIV. 
61
 U.S. Const. Amend XIV, Sec. 1. 
62
 I would like to provide special thanks to Michigan State 
University- Detroit College of Law Associate Dean and 
Professor of Law Michael A. Lawrence for providing me with a 
draft copy of his recently published paper Do “ Creatures Of 
The State ” Have Constitutional Rights?: Standing For 
Municipalities To Assert Procedural Due Process Claims 
Against The State. Villanova L. Rev. Vol. 47, No. 1, 93, 
2002, (discussing the tangentially related concept of 
municipal standing to sue the state in certain instances). 
63
 “At the heart of the Constitution’s guarantee of equal 
protection lies the simple command that the Government must 
treat citizens as individuals[.]”   Metro Broadcasting, Inc. 
v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602 (1990) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(quoting Arizona Governing Comm. For Tax Deferred 
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1083 (1983)).  
Municipal employees are, in all likelihood, citizens of the 
state in which the city they work for is located.  As such, 
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have been rare cases where municipalities have successfully 
argued for constitutional protection, but these are 
inapplicable to the present circumstances.64   
Instead, a much stronger argument can be made on behalf 
of the individuals affected by the states prohibition on 
weapons restrictions.  “ The purpose of the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is to secure every person 
within the State’s jurisdiction against intentional and 
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express 
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly 
constituted agents. ” 65 
An Equal Protection argument, whether used as a defense 
or in seeking a declaratory judgment, should be structured 
into a three-pronged analysis.  The first issue is whether 
there are limitations to the states power to preempt.  Using 
                                                                                                                                                 
it is well recognized that any citizen of a state may bring 
an action against that state for violations under the equal 
protection clause.  Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982).  
For a proposition similar to that of municipal employees 
having standing as residents of the municipality and 
citizens of the state; in the context of a Congressional 
district, rather than a municipal subdivision, see, Miller 
v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 909 (1999) (recognizing that 
residents of a Congressional district have standing to bring 
a claim arising from actions of the state concerning that 
Congressional district).   
64
 See, People ex rel. Park Commrs. v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 
(1873) (discussing the absence of state authority to control 
the action of a municipal corporation where the common 
council has been authorized by the legislature to issue 
bonds and the common council refused, despite a site having 
been selected for the purchase of a park in accordance with 
the original plans of the municipality, because in matters 
of purely local concern, the state has no right to control 
local action).   
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the U.S. Supreme Courts Equal Protection analysis in Romer66, 
it appears that there are limits, in that a state may not 
draw irrational conclusions, and base statutes upon 
irrational assumptions.  Second, assuming there are limits 
to the states authority to pass laws preempting municipal 
protections of constitutional rights, the municipality and 
its employees must identify a group or groups of similarly 
situated individuals or governmental units that are 
receiving different protection under the law, and that the 
law, as applied, is violated because the law makes 
irrational distinctions between the identified classes.  
Finally, the municipality or its employees must demonstrate 
that there is no rational basis for this law in the 
identified context.  
 
 A. Traditional Equal Protection Analysis 
 The United States Supreme Court in Romer v. Evans67 has 
laid out the standard for making an equal protection 
challenge to a state law.  In an ordinary equal protection 
claim, where the alleged victim is not a member of a suspect 
or quasi-suspect class, the challenged law must withstand a 
rational relationship challenge.68  “The general rule is 
that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be 
                                                                                                                                                 
65
 Sioux City Bridge Co., v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 
(1923) (quoting Sunday Lake Iron Co. v. Township of 
Wakefield, 247 U.S. 350, 352 (1918)). 
66
 Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. 
67 Romer, 517 U.S. at 620. 
68 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
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sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.69  As 
noted earlier, “ even in the ordinary equal protection case 
calling for the most deferential of standards, [the U.S. 
Supreme Court] insist[s] on knowing the relationship between 
the classification adopted and the object to obtained.” 70  
The challenged law must bear a rational relationship to a 
legitimate state interest, and this paper concedes that the 
alleged interest may even be hypothetical.   However, even a 
hypothetical interest must be rational, and the interests of 
the state in this matter, are not. 
 The state has enumerated its interests in passing the 
shall-issue law as being designed to simplify the 
application process and to achieve greater uniformity in the 
ability of applicants to obtain a concealed weapons permit.71  
The state has also asserted an interest in making it easier 
for law-abiding citizens to obtain a concealed weapons 
permit.72  While these interests are certainly cognizable 
state-interests, the question remains whether these 
interests would be impeded by a restriction on where such a 
concealed weapon could be carried, and if they are not, the 
law is not rational. 
                                                 
69 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 
439 (1985). 
70 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632. 
71
 House Legislative Analysis, Revised First Analysis (6-8-
99), Second Analysis (7-26-99, Third Analysis as Enrolled 
(1-4-01). 
72 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.421a (2001). 
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 Although it appears that the statute challenged by this 
paper might fail a traditional, facial challenge under the 
Equal Protection Clause, where the burden on those 
challenging the statute is to demonstrate that there is no 
set of circumstances where the law would be valid73; that is 
not the type of challenge being proposed by this paper.  
Instead, this paper challenges the law, as applied; a much 
narrower and less widely accepted approach to Equal 
Protection claims.  However, before moving to that portion 
of the analysis it is important to examine whether there are 
any limitations on state power to restrict municipal 
authority in the first place. 
 
 B. Limitations On State Power To Preempt Local 
Authority 
 The Michigan Supreme Court has recognized a distinction 
in municipal authority that is primarily “administrative ”, 
as opposed to “ legislative. ” 74  In Kropf, the Michigan 
Supreme Court examined a zoning ordinance and the authority 
of the legislature to delegate authority to local units of 
government.  Although this case is factually dissimilar, 
several propositions of law regarding the burdens that must 
be met in showing that a law is irrational apply to this 
paper.  The specific analysis of interest to this paper is 
                                                 
73
 Baker v. City of Concord,  916 F.2d 744, 753 (1st Cir., 
1990). 
74
 Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 215 N.W.2d 179, 190 
(Mich. 1974) (Levin, J., concurring). 
 31 
that the legislature, when delegating authority to a local 
unit of government, is free to grant all administrative 
powers to that unit of government.75  This is especially true 
when the administrative powers conferred are used to 
regulate a purely local concern, like the entrance into a 
local building. 
Furthermore, the Michigan Supreme Court has explicitly 
pointed out that “Michigan is strongly committed to the 
concept of home rule, and constitutional and statutory 
provisions which grant power to municipalities are to be 
liberally construed. ” 76  Directing this principle toward the 
shall-issue law as it works in combination with the no-
interference law as applied to home rule cities, establishes 
that there are likely to be limitations on the state’s 
authority to preempt local rule.  First, because there is at 
least limited historical support for such a restriction, as 
pointed out earlier in discussing People ex rel. Park 
Commrs.77  And second, because the policy of home rule is 
firmly established in Michigan, to fail to recognize this 
principle would render the historical strong commitment 
meaningless. 
                                                 
75 Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 215 N.W.2d at 190, FN2 
(Levin, J., concurring) (citing the authority conferred by 
the Michigan Constitution in Article 7). 
76 Bivens v. Grand Rapids, 505 N.W. 2d 239, 243 (Mich. 1993) 
(holding that while a municipality may not pass an ordinance 
conflicting with a state statute or the Constitution, there 
are powers that are necessarily implied to exist, and a city 
may exercise those powers). 
77 See, People ex rel. Park Commrs. v. Detroit, 28 Mich. 228 
(1873). 
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 C. Differential Treatment Violating The Equal 
Protection Clause 
It is hornbook law that the U.S. Constitution “ neither 
knows nor 
tolerates classes among citizens. ” 78  How this works in the 
real world, where classes exist, and are recognized on a 
daily basis, is less clear.  In this paper we must examine 
whether an interest of the state is promoted by prohibiting 
a weapon on municipal property.  The two interests claimed 
by the law are an increase in uniformity in issuing permits, 
and a desire to make obtaining a concealed weapons permit 
easier.  A law prohibiting an individual from voluntarily 
entering property with a concealed weapon does not burden 
either of these interests.  The law prohibiting a municipal 
restriction is clearly not rationally related to achieving 
either of these interests. 
For a local official to make a claim of an equal 
protection violation he must first assert a class to which 
his treatment has been differentiated.  In the present 
matter, there are three identified groups to which the state 
has opted to treat differently.  First, the state, by its 
post-enactment behavior, has opted to treat state controlled 
buildings differently than municipally controlled 
                                                 
78 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting 
opinion). 
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buildings.79  Second, subdivisions of the courts, by judicial 
interpretation of the law, are treated differently than 
subdivisions of the legislature.80  Third, the venues the 
legislature has determined to be exempted are treated 
differently than municipal buildings without a clear 
rationale.81 
                                                 
79
 See, Authors notes, referenced at FN 24, supra. 
80
 Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order, 2001-1 (March 
27, 2001) (allowing all lower courts in the state to craft 
court rules that prohibit weapons wherever the court sees 
fit). 
81
 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.425o provides; 
An individual licensed under this act to carry a 
concealed pistol, or who is exempt from licensure 
under section 12a(f), shall not carry a pistol on 
the premises of any of the following: 
(a) A school or school property except that a 
parent or legal guardian of a student of the 
school is not precluded from carrying a 
concealed pistol while in a vehicle on school 
property, if he or she is dropping the student 
off at the school or picking the child up from 
the school… 
(b) A public or private day care center, public 
or private child caring agency, or public or 
private child placing agency. 
(c) A sports arena or stadium. 
(d) A dining room, lounge, or bar area of a 
premises licensed under the Michigan liquor 
control code… 
(e) Any property owned or operated by a church, 
synagogue, mosque, temple or other place of 
worship, unless the presiding official or 
officials of the church, synagogue, mosque, 
temple or other place of worship permit the 
carrying of concealed pistol on that property 
or facility. 
(f) An entertainment facility that the individual 
knows or should know has a seating capacity of 
2,500 or more individuals or that has a sign 
above each public entrance stating in letters 
not less than 1-inch high a seating capacity of 
2,500 or more individuals. 
(g) A hospital. 
(h) A dormitory or classroom of a community 
college, college, or university. 
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Once differentially treated classes are identified, the 
municipality must demonstrate that the law is applied in a 
non-neutral fashion.82  In the present circumstances, 
although the state has enumerated certain interests, certain 
individuals are treated differently under the law without 
clear reasons for the boundaries.  For example, school 
employees work in an environment where weapons have been 
prohibited by the statute.83  Other branches of government 
receive different treatment than municipalities most 
notably, the judicial branch is permitted by Michigan 
Supreme Court Order, to prohibit weapons in any building 
where court employees regularly perform their duties.84   
Although a claim might be made under the difference in 
treatment between municipalities and courts, the stronger 
argument applies to school property like administrative 
buildings.  It is conceivable that a legitimate state 
interest might be served in prohibiting weapons where 
juveniles, with juvenile judgment, are present.  This 
interest is not protected on school property where students 
are not regularly present, like the Administrative Offices 
of Detroit Public Schools.  It is this difference in 
protection that gives rise to the alleged Equal Protection 
claim addressed in this paper. 
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 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623. 
83 Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 28.425o(a) (2001). 
84 Michigan Supreme Court Administrative Order, 2001-1 (March 
27, 2001). 
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It is important to compare several of the articulated 
exemptions for private property to similar uses present in 
municipal property to establish that there is no rational 
basis for the distinctions.  The prohibition on bringing a 
weapon to school or onto school property or to day care 
centers, child caring agencies, or child placing agencies 
seems particularly sound.  However, the law should not stop 
there.  There is no rational reason to draw a distinction 
between a community center, where youth recreation leagues 
regularly gather, and schools.   
Sports arenas or stadiums as well as entertainment 
facilities with seating capacities of 2,500 or more are much 
like public parks and other large public facilities.  In 
Grand Rapids, Michigan tens of thousands of people gather at 
Ah-Nab-A-Wen Park on the banks of the Grand River for public 
concerts and fireworks, yet the police have no authority to 
prohibit firearms at these events, although the same 
interests that would foster a prohibition in a stadium would 
apply equally to such a location.  Even places of worship 
are given the discretion to decide for themselves whether or 
not to allow weapons.  Clearly, at least some of the reasons 
for attending a church go beyond the spiritual and extend to 
the sense of community and fellowship one feels; these are 
similar functions to those of a municipality and represent 
at least some degree of related purpose.  And hospitals, 
dormitories, and college classrooms ought to be compared to 
adult respite care facilities, and community enrichment 
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classes offered by numerous municipalities throughout the 
state.  If the state were rational in its selection of these 
exemptions, that rationality would also extend so far as to 
apply to municipal property being used for similar purposes. 
 
D. As Applied Challenges Under The Equal Protection 
Clause Are Recognized By The Supreme Court 
Although under a traditional facial challenge it is 
necessary to demonstrate no set of circumstances where a law 
would be valid, the same is not true under an as-applied 
challenge.  The traditional view would hold that the courts 
should not redraft overbroad statutes through the cumbersome 
process of as-applied constitutional rulings simply to make 
a law constitutional under every set of circumstances.85  
However, even Justice Marshall, who dissented to the 
principle of violating Equal Protection as applied, conceded 
that the approach might be defensible if the challenged 
portion of the law could be easily severed.86 
The touchstone principal of this prong of the equal 
protection claim asserted in this paper is that there is a 
recognized concept of equal protection as applied, and that 
it is this principle that is violated by the shall-issue 
law.  In Britell v. United States87 a federal district court 
                                                 
85
 Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
86 Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 476 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting). 
87
 Britell v. United States, 150 F.Supp. 2d 211 (D. Mass., 
2001). 
 37 
in Massachusetts analyzed the concept of equal protection as 
applied and concluded that such a claim could be maintained 
and was long recognized in federal jurisprudence.   
Equal Protection As-Applied involves the recognition of 
a distinction between a facial challenge to a law, where no 
set of circumstances exist under which the law would be 
valid, and a less rigorous challenge where although the law 
might have constitutional applications, none of those 
applications apply to the circumstances giving rise to the 
action.88  Although not as often invoked, or as strongly 
supported, the concept of equal protection as applied has 
Supreme Court support, as well as the support of numerous 
appellate and district courts throughout the United States.  
In addition to Cleburne Living Centers and Romer the Supreme 
Court recognized as-applied challenges involving state laws 
treating real property owners and non-real property owners 
differently89, and in the context of the right of homosexuals 
to serve in the Navy.90  The Britell court, in analyzing the 
concept of equal protection as applied, concluded that such 
a claim is legally cognizable.91 If the same rationale is 
used in the challenging of the shall issue law, it should 
lead to a recognition that this case would also meet the as 
applied burden, because that burden, at its simplest is only 
to establish that the law does not serve its otherwise 
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 Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. at 443-446. 
89
 Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95, 103 n. 8 (1989). 
90
 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
91
 Britell, 150 F.Supp. 2d 221-222. 
 38 
rational ends when applied to the particular circumstances 
giving rise to the cause of action.92 
 
E. No Rational Basis For The Law As Applied 
Having established that there is support for the 
principle of violating equal protection as applied, the 
final question is whether the law might serve a hypothetical 
or unarticulated interest that is furthered when the law is 
applied against municipal buildings.  If there is not, then 
an ordinance contradicting the statute would be successful 
because the law would fail an equal protection challenge as 
applied by a municipal employee. 
In Britell93, a woman brought a claim against the 
Civilian Health and Medical Program of the Uniformed 
Services (CHAMPUS).  The issue revolved around the 
rationality of a CHAMPUS prohibition on paying for abortions 
based upon fetal abnormalities.  Specifically, the 
articulated interest furthered by the CHAMPUS prohibition 
was to promote life.  In Britell, that interest, as applied 
to the plaintiff, was not furthered because she was carrying 
an anencephalic fetus that had no chance of survival after 
birth.  The judge ruled that the articulated state interest 
was not rational on its face, as applied to Britell, and 
allowed the case to proceed with proofs.  Unfortunately, the 
hearing in Britell was the last judicial proceeding on the 
                                                 
92
 Britell, 150 F.Supp. 2d 223-224. 
93 Britell, 150 F.Supp. 2d 211.  
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matter, and a final ruling on the merits has not been 
produced.  Notwithstanding this fact, the principles 
enunciated in Britell, are equally applicable to the present 
matter. 
First, the treatment of state controlled buildings 
should be substantially similar to municipally controlled 
buildings because their missions are substantially similar 
and the threat to one is likely to be similar to a threat to 
another.  To take the most extreme example, city hall in New 
York City, is at least as good of a target for a gun-toting 
terrorist as the state capital in Albany, New York.  While 
New York is not Michigan, and New York City is not Detroit, 
the principle is clear.  Also, it is unlikely that 
protecting one and not the other further the aforementioned 
articulated state interests. 
 Second, subdivisions of the courts, by judicial 
interpretation of the law, are treated differently that 
subdivisions of the legislature without a basis for doing so 
that would further a state interest.  The courts have 
clearly recognized that the law, as written could not have 
been meant to be applied as broadly as written, and this 
principle is equally extensible to municipal buildings. 
Finally, the venues that the legislature has determined 
to be exempted are treated differently than municipal 
buildings without a clear rationale.  In fact, if a 
rationale could be articulated by the state, it is likely 
that it would be a substantially similar rationale to the 
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rationale espoused by municipalities and their employees.  
For example, if there is a hypothetical rationale like 
protecting people from accidental discharge in a crowded 
stadium, this rationale would apply just as well to a 
crowded assembly room at city hall.  Even if the state were 
to argue that the goal of the statute is furthered by 
allowing weapons in as many places as possible because it is 
an expressly enunciated right in both the state and federal 
constitutions, this is to no avail because clearly, 
municipal buildings fall outside of the “ as many places as 
possible”  goal.   
The ultimate position of any court evaluating this law 
under the scenarios described above should be to accept 
Justice Marshall’s recognition that there may be times when 
an as applied challenge should be recognized if the law can 
be easily fixed.  In this case, rather than excising the 
unconstitutional portion, the better approach would be to 
read in the necessary addition; no weapons in municipal 
buildings.  Or even narrower, that home rule cities may 
prohibit weapons on municipal property.  Either approach 
leaves the law substantially intact while protecting the 
rights and safety of municipal officials and employees.   
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VIII. MODEL CITY ORDINANCE94 
There are several factors to be considered in passing a 
municipal ordinance.  The following is a suggested ordinance 
only, and should be modified with references to the 
appropriate authority of the city using it.   
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING THE POSSESSION OF A WEAPON 
IN ANY BUILDING OR FACILITY IN THE CITY OF ____, 
PROVIDING FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THIS ORDINANCE 
EFFECTIVE ______ 2002. 
 
Whereas, the possession of firearms, and other 
dangerous weapons poses a threat to the health and 
safety of the general public, the employees, and 
the officials of the City of_____, 
 
Whereas, the City of       is a Home Rule City 
authorized and empowered to enact laws pertaining 
to purely local concerns, 
 
Whereas, the State has no interest which outweighs 
the sanctity and security of human life,  
 
The City of          enacts: 
 
Section 1.Purpose. The City Council of the City 
of      , pursuant to its constitutional and 
statutory authority to enact ordinances pertaining 
to City affairs, and pursuant to its authority to 
care for and manage the buildings and property of 
the City, adopts this Ordinance to regulate the 
possession of weapons in any City building or 
facility owned leased or operated by or on behalf 
of the City of     .  The purpose of this 
Ordinance is to protect the safety of members of 
the general public, the employees and the 
officials of the City of     , and to ensure the 
effective operation of municipal government. 
 
                                                 
94
 Special thanks to Greg Rappley, corporate counsel for 
Ottawa County, Michigan who graciously and generously 
provided me with a draft copy of an ordinance potentially to 
be considered by the Ottawa County Commission.  It was that 
draft copy that I used as a model for the above Ordinance 
(please note, the above ordinance has been extensively 
modified to reflect provisions I believe are necessary). 
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Section 2.Definitions. When used in this 
Ordinance, the following words and phrases shall 
have the meanings ascribed to each respectively.  
 
(a) “ City building or facility ” shall mean any 
building, facility, structure, or accompanying 
parking lot owned leased, or operated by or on 
behalf of the City of     . 
 
(b) “ Person”  shall mean any natural person, but 
not including any local, state, or federal law 
enforcement officer who is regularly authorized to 
carry weapons, including firearms, in the 
performance of his or her duties. 
 
(c) “ Weapon”  shall mean a knife, dagger, dirk, 
stiletto or other cutting device; a shotgun, 
rifle, handgun, or other firearm; a cs device as 
defined by law; a club, baton or other device that 
may be reasonably construed as an instrument 
intended to be used to bludgeon another person; or 
any explosive device or materials. 
 
Section 3.Prohibition and Regulations. No person 
shall possess any weapon in or on any city 
building or facility.   
 
Section 4.Posting.  The City shall conspicuously 
post, at every intended point of entrance, a sign 
advising invitees and guests of the prohibition on 
possessing weapons while on City premises.  Each 
notice shall reference this Ordinance, the above 
definition of weapon, and the maximum penalty 
imposed under this Ordinance. 
 
Section 5.Penalties.  A person who violates this 
Ordinance shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and 
shall pay a fine not to exceed $500.00, or be 
imprisoned for a period not to exceed ninety days, 
or both. 
 
Section 6.Conflict With Criminal Laws.  Nothing in 
this Section shall be construed to conflict with, 
contravene, enlarge, or reduce any criminal 
liability or responsibility, including other fines 
or penalties imposed by a judge for any criminal 
offense under Michigan law. 
 
Section 7.Severability.  The phrases, sentences, 
sections and provisions of this Section are 
severable, and the finding that any portion hereof 
is unconstitutional or otherwise unenforceable 
shall not detract from or affect the 
enforceability of the remainder of this Ordinance. 
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 Section 8.Repeal of Conflicting Ordinances.  All 
other Ordinances, parts of Ordinances, or 
amendments thereto, any of which are in conflict 
with the provisions of this Ordinance, are hereby 
repealed in their entirety to the extent of such 
conflict.  
 
This ordinance should also be made to include 
notification of approval, an effective date, and publication 
provisions.   
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
In sum, it appears that there is a viable means of 
challenging the validity of the new concealed weapons law as 
it may be applied to municipal authority to restrict such 
weapons on municipal property.  There is no real or 
hypothetical state interest furthered by such a prohibition. 
I suggest, that if a challenge to the law is made on 
these grounds, the best forum to adjudicate such a 
constitutional claim would be in the Federal courts.  The 
initial challenge to the law was defeated in Michigan’s 
Supreme Court, and the majority of the justices have 
demonstrated at least some hostility toward restrictions 
they perceive to impinge upon the right to keep and bear 
arms.   
The shall-issue law, when combined with the broad 
prohibitions on municipal authority to restrict firearms on 
municipal premises furthers no legitimate state interest and 
is irrational as applied to municipalities.  Perhaps the 
best reading of the law is “read in ”  the clause 
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“ municipalities shall not regulate possession of firearms 
outside of municipal property. ”  The law should be 
interpreted broadly and the public health welfare and safety 
ought to be protected, and this reading will accomplish that 
end. 
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